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Funding models in palliative care: Lessons 
from international experience
E Iris Groeneveld1, J Brian Cassel2, Claudia Bausewein3, 
Ágnes Csikós4, Malgorzata Krajnik5, Karen Ryan6, 
Dagny Faksvåg Haugen7,8, Steffen Eychmueller9, 
Heike Gudat Keller10, Simon Allan11, Jeroen Hasselaar12, 
Teresa García-Baquero Merino13, Kate Swetenham14, 
Kym Piper15, Carl Johan Fürst16 and Fliss EM Murtagh1
Abstract
Background: Funding models influence provision and development of palliative care services. As palliative care integrates into 
mainstream health care provision, opportunities to develop funding mechanisms arise. However, little has been reported on what 
funding models exist or how we can learn from them.
Aim: To assess national models and methods for financing and reimbursing palliative care.
Design: Initial literature scoping yielded limited evidence on the subject as national policy documents are difficult to identify, access 
and interpret. We undertook expert consultations to appraise national models of palliative care financing in England, Germany, 
Hungary, Republic of Ireland, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States and 
Wales. These represent different levels of service development and a variety of funding mechanisms.
Results: Funding mechanisms reflect country-specific context and local variations in care provision. Patterns emerging include the 
following:
•  Provider payment is rarely linked to population need and often perpetuates existing inequitable patterns in service provision.
• Funding is frequently characterised as a mixed system of charitable, public and private payers.
• The basis on which providers are paid for services rarely reflects individual care input or patient needs.
Conclusion: Funding mechanisms need to be well understood and used with caution to ensure best practice and minimise perverse 
incentives. Before we can conduct cross-national comparisons of costs and impact of palliative care, we need to understand the 
funding and policy context for palliative care in each country of interest.
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What is already known about the topic?
 • Financing models influence provision and development of palliative care services.
 • Comparisons of the regulation of palliative care in several European countries have been published.1
What this paper adds?
 • Models of palliative care and funding flows in a range of countries are described in a consistent and systematic way for 
the first time.
 • This study demonstrates that palliative care financing is often characterised by a mixed-payer system, that provider pay-
ment may perpetuate existing inequitable patterns in service provision and that reimbursement for services rarely 
reflects individual care input or patient needs.
 • It also shows that palliative care is not always integrated into health systems financing.
Implications for practice, theory or policy
 • Cross-national comparisons of costs and impact of palliative care depend on understanding national funding and policy 
context.
 • Reshaping funding models requires active involvement of palliative care leaders to ensure best practice and minimise 
perverse incentives.
Background
Provision of health and social care towards the end of life 
is a major resource burden, with estimates of spending in 
the last year of life ranging from 10% of all health care 
costs in The Netherlands2 and 13% in the United States of 
America (USA)3 to as high as 25% of Medicare hospice 
spending4 and 29% of English National Health Service 
hospital spending.5 Changing demographics, with an age-
ing population, longer chronic disease trajectories and 
greater co-morbidity, provide further incentives to improve 
quality and capacity of care for the dying. These factors 
create an urgent need to develop sustainable, widely 
accepted, patient-centred and cost-effective models for the 
funding and allocation of resources, while promoting high-
quality palliative care across settings, and to deliver over-
all efficiency for the health and social care systems. 
Despite this, there is limited understanding of how much 
the actual costs of care provision relate to reimbursed 
costs, let alone how these costs compare with outcomes;6 
this is true in palliative care as for other areas of care.
Palliative care funding arrangements should be under-
stood in a wider system of health, social and informal 
care. Funding, availability and use of these health, social 
and informal sectors are each connected to palliative care 
provision. For example, the availability of grants to sup-
port informal carers may for instance reduce the need for 
hospital admissions. Similarly, the level and funding of 
general palliative care, which is provided by care profes-
sionals whose main focus is treating patients with life- 
limiting disease but who do not focus solely on palliative 
care,7,8 influences specialist palliative care.
However, in order to examine funding arrangements 
with sufficient detail to be useful, this article will focus on 
‘specialist’ or ‘dedicated’ palliative care services. Variation 
in palliative care services exists not only in the type and 
content of services provided but also in the ways that pal-
liative care services are funded. Differences in funding 
mechanisms may in fact drive differences in the type and 
content of services, as well as how many patients are 
served and when in their disease course. Within each coun-
try, funding models tend to change over time, offering 
opportunities for palliative care leaders to shape future 
funding mechanisms for palliative care.
This study therefore aims to review the international 
experience of funding for specialist palliative care ser-
vices. Objectives are (1) to identify and appraise national 
models of palliative care financing and (2) to compare the 
identified funding models and draw critical lessons from 
international experience.
Methods
Initially, a literature review was conducted to elicit meth-
ods used internationally for commissioning specialist pal-
liative care services for adults. However, the literature 
retrieved was not sufficient to draw a complete picture of 
service and funding arrangements, even after additional 
targeted literature searches. Relevant materials were dif-
ficult to identify as they were often only available in the 
language of origin. Access to resources proved difficult, 
as detailed policy documents are not always publicly 
available. Moreover, interpretation of these documents 
was highly dependent on a country-specific context, 
which is not always made explicit in most documents. We 
therefore undertook expert consultations, to gain an 
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in-depth understanding of local arrangements for pallia-
tive care funding, and the context in which they operate.
Countries were selected to represent high-income 
countries (Europe, North America and Oceania), differ-
ent levels of palliative care development and a diversity 
of funding models. A topic guide for the consultations 
was compiled to create a complete overview of the cur-
rent state of palliative care provision, its funding mecha-
nisms, (imminent or proposed) future changes and main 
challenges, based on Deber et al.9 framework for analy-
sis of health service financing (see below) and Mason 
et al.10 international review of mental health services 
financing.
Country experts, defined as people with an active inter-
est in palliative care policy and/or funding, were 
approached to participate in this work themselves or to 
propose other experts. Expert consultations were arranged 
to take place face-to-face or by telephone, and in one case 
by email correspondence. Detailed summaries based on 
the notes taken during the conversation were written by the 
interviewer (no audio recordings were made). These were 
then sent to the expert for review and correction. Where 
possible, consultation with an additional country expert 
was conducted to verify and supplement the information 
provided by the first expert (10 of 14 country experts were 
verified by a second expert). Preference was given to 
experts who did not know one another; however, given the 
small size of this field of interest, this was not always pos-
sible (5 of 10 countries had experts who had not worked 
together). Clarification and additional justification (litera-
ture) was sought when information provided by the experts 
was contradictory. If no consensus was found, this is 
described as such in the ‘Results’ section. All country 
experts were invited to comment on the manuscript and 
invited as co-authors.
Theoretical framework
In the absence of unequivocal scientific evidence in favour 
or against methods for payment of health care providers, 
consideration of the incentives and disincentives of differ-
ent options provides more meaningful information. Deber 
et al.9 present a useful theoretical framework to aid catego-
risation of different funding options and to establish their 
relative benefits. It takes into account ‘the relationship 
between policy goals, health care organisation, and pay-
ment approaches’, to determine which mechanisms are 
most suitable given the context in which they are consid-
ered. The framework consists of three components: (A) 
Need, demand and utilisation, (B) Funding flows and (C) 
Basis of payment (details in Figure 1 and Table 1). We 
focus on component B (Funding flows), in particular the 
aspects ‘who pays?’ and ‘who allocates?’, and component 
C (Basis of payment) to gain a good understanding of pal-
liative care financing.
Results
A total of 14 countries were included in the review: Australia, 
England, Germany, Hungary, the Republic of Ireland, New 
Zealand, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the USA, and Wales. Across these countries, 
palliative care and hospice services are provided that can be 
categorised by the setting of care: (1) specific palliative or 
hospice inpatient units, (2) hospital-based advisory services 
(inpatient or outpatient) and (3) community-based services 
in usual place of residence, inpatient hospice-based and com-
munity-based inpatient and outpatient and advisory services. 
However, there is much variation in organisation of these 
services between countries. Throughout this article, different 
countries are highlighted to illustrate strengths and short-
comings of funding arrangements and their consequences for 
Figure 1. Streams of funding and reimbursement in health care.9
Table 1. Elements of models of funding and reimbursement of 
health care.9
A:  The relationship among need, demand and utilisation and how 
this relates to the rationale for public involvement. This 
informs the context in which the palliative care services 
are provided.
B:  The nature of funding flows and how this affects the policy 
levers, consisting of:
Financing – Who pays for services?
This could be individuals, public or private third-party 
payers (insurers), or mixed payment systems.
Delivery – Who provides the services?
Options include public sector, not-for-profit firms with 
paid workers, not-for-profit volunteers, for profit small 
business, for profit investor owned, or individuals and 
their families.
Allocation – Who allocates resources?
This is the link between financing and delivery and 
recognises variation in the incentives inherent in various 
arrangements (the framework distinguishes between 
organisational structures and bases for payment).
C:  The potential basis for payment, on which resources can 
flow to those delivering care. Examples include block 
contracts, payment per bed day and per head (capitation).
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service provision. Country-specific funding details were last 
updated in April 2015. Since this is a fast-changing area of 
work, it is possible that funding arrangements have changed 
since.
Need, demand and utilisation (A)
The relationship between need, demand, and utilisation 
informs the context in which palliative care services are 
provided. Mismatches between policy goals and palliative 
care funding mechanisms can leave needs unmet. We pro-
vide examples below of these mismatches, illustrating 
limitations in access to services from a range of issues, 
which are supported by policy goals but constrained by 
funding arrangements (Table 1).
Early access to palliative care services is an internation-
ally recognised policy goal.11 In the United States, access 
to the hospice benefit is only available when life expec-
tancy is less than 6 months, and when active treatment is 
discontinued,12 although there are current moves to change 
this. While palliative care may be available to patients 
who are in an earlier disease stage, this policy continues to 
limit the chances of considering palliative care treatment 
early and uptake of hospice benefit.
In Hungary, a single payment is received for each day on 
which the community-based palliative care team visits the 
patient, irrespective of the number or length of visits. 
Funding for each patient is limited to 150 visits over a longer 
period, but approximately 5% of patients require more than 
150 days care. Charitable funding can usually cover these 
costs, but this is less secure, and leads to inequalities in 
service provision on the basis of illness duration and for 
those diagnoses with longer trajectories of illness.
In Hungary, non-cancer patients may account for up to 
20% of all patients cared for in community-based and 
inpatient services, to receive statutory funding. If services 
want to provide to a larger proportion of non-cancer 
patients, cross-subsidisation by the provider is required. 
Although other types of services may be available to non-
cancer patients, this arrangement principally means une-
qual access to care based on diagnosis. Similarly, in 
Poland, no reimbursement is received unless the illness is 
specified on a particular list.
Geographical variation in palliative care provision is a 
problem in many countries, as services are often more 
available in urban areas. In Wales, start-up funding has 
been made available to encourage service development in 
areas with high need. The absence of incentives for service 
provision in rural areas could be perceived as a shortcom-
ing or missed opportunity in current funding arrangements, 
as this sustains inequity of access to services.
The nature of funding flows (B)
The nature of funding flows between financing, service 
delivery and allocation roles in a funding model impacts 
the delivery of palliative care services. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the national arrangements for collection of 
funding in each country, highlighting whether palliative 
care is part of the main funding system, whether a dedi-
cated palliative care budget exists, and reliance on charita-
ble funds and out-of-pocket payments (or co-payments).
Table 2. Overview of funding collection for palliative care services.
Country Integration in 
predominant system 
for funding collection
Dedicated 
palliative care 
budget
Main allocation mechanism Reliance on 
charitable funds 
(self-reported)
Out-of-pocket 
payments
Australia − + Public third party − −
England + + Public third party + −
Germany + − Public and private third party + −
Hungary + + Public third party, some through 
hospital budget
+ −
Ireland + + Public third party, some through 
general health care budget
+ + (private insurance 
cover available)
New 
Zealand
+ + Public third party, some through 
hospital budget
+ −
The 
Netherlands
+ + Hospital: private third party, 
Hospice: private third parties
+ + (private insurance 
cover available)
Norway + + Public third party − −
Poland + + Public third party + −
Spain + + Public third party + −
Sweden + + Public third party − −
Switzerland + + Public and private third parties − +
USA + + Public and private third parties + +
Wales + + Public third party + −
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Integration of palliative care funding in 
predominant system for revenue collection
In most countries, funding for palliative care services is 
financed through the same system as mainstream heath 
financing. However, mixed funding models exist in most 
countries, meaning that service providers depend on mul-
tiple resources.
Hospital-based services tend to have a higher propor-
tion of their costs covered through the main funding frame-
work (either public or private insurance), in comparison 
with community-based services providing specific pallia-
tive care outside the hospital. In some countries, this may 
be explained by the development of community-based pal-
liative care services by the charitable sector. In some coun-
tries, the proportion of government contributions towards 
palliative or hospice inpatient units running costs is fixed 
(i.e. 70% in New Zealand), but in other countries statutory 
funding seems to be unequally distributed. In England (the 
United Kingdom), for instance, a 14-fold variation in pal-
liative care spend per death was observed between primary 
care trusts across the country.13 Similarly, the percentage 
of total income from statutory funding ranges widely 
between different hospice inpatient units in the United 
Kingdom, from 20% to 50%, relying on charitable income 
such as donations or return on investments to cover remain-
ing costs.14
Dedicated palliative care budget
Predictable funding streams help services adopt sustaina-
ble models of care and support service development with 
long-term perspectives. Anecdotally, in The Netherlands, 
the introduction of a new funding mechanism for palliative 
care for hospital-consult/advisory services in 2012, the 
introduction of academic hospital expert centres and crite-
ria for palliative care consultation in oncology have pro-
vided increased visibility and stability for hospital 
palliative care,15 but continuous efforts are needed. The 
absence of ongoing dedicated financing from the main 
health care funder – often a government – leads to services 
relying on resources to be made available by other means.
Allocation mechanism
The mechanisms for allocating funds (usually a public or 
private third party) determine whether resources are read-
ily available to services. Despite central regulation of pal-
liative care services in Hungary, for example, outpatient 
palliative care services do not receive government fund-
ing. Services therefore rely on funding to be made availa-
ble from the general hospital budgets, and facilities and 
equipment from the oncology wards, offering limited sta-
bility and sustainability in service provision. Similarly, 
payment of government funding in Spain is unpredictable 
and unreliable, making it necessary to turn to more stable 
charitable funding.
In Germany, resource allocation is locally negotiated 
between providers and insurance companies, which causes 
limited transparency and local variation in funding 
availability.
High reliance on charitable funds (self-
reported)
In the majority of countries, strong charitable support of 
palliative care services is reported. The strong links with 
the charitable sector provide access to additional sources 
of funding. In Poland, services receive a payment per bed 
day (per diem) from the National Health Fund (NHF). 
Public and charitable organisations receive a similar 
amount of funding if their services are financed by the 
NHF, but the latter are able to top this funding up. This 
leads to variation in services available to patients, a so-
called post-code lottery. Dependency on charitable fund-
ing may provide less stable funding flows in the current 
economic climate.
Considerable out-of-pocket payments
In Switzerland, The Netherlands, Ireland and the USA, 
patients are required to pay (part) of the service fees directly 
to the service provider, often referred to as ‘out of pocket’ 
payments or co-payments. Optional supplementary insur-
ance is available to cover additional service costs in The 
Netherlands and Ireland, but comes at a higher insurance 
premium. Those who do not take out supplementary insur-
ance pay additional costs out of pocket. Inappropriate out-
of-pocket arrangements can limit access to and use of 
services. In Germany, patients were required to make out-
of-pocket payment for their stay in hospice inpatient units 
of up to €90 per day, when statutory and insurance funding 
combined were insufficient. Social funding was available 
for people who were unable to afford this fee. However, 
this led to fear of opening up one’s financial administration 
and potentially involving family, causing fear and embar-
rassment. As a consequence, access to hospice inpatient 
units was reduced for some, often less advantaged, groups. 
This led to a policy response to ban the out-of-pocket pay-
ment and require statutory/insurance funding to cover 90% 
of hospice running costs. Hospice inpatient units must now 
raise 10% of expenses through charity.16 With new legisla-
tion for hospice and palliative care in Germany, this has 
now been reduced to 5%.
Transparency of funding flows
Funding flows impact quality, availability and access to 
services. Smaller services may be disadvantaged in navi-
gating and negotiating funding. Moreover, variation in 
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funding streams between different types of care and 
between different service providers complicate compari-
sons of ‘value for money’, restraining responsible service 
development.
The basis for payment (C)
Table 3 shows whether payment for palliative care services 
is integrated in each country’s main payment mechanism, 
as well as the basis for payment. In five countries included 
in this work, the basis of payment to providers is not 
organised in the same way as other types of care. A prob-
able explanation lies in palliative care service develop-
ment in the charitable sector, prolonging early public 
funding arrangements even when these have become the 
main source of revenue. Where payment for palliative care 
services follows the country’s main payment system, this 
is the result of newly arising opportunities for integration. 
In Germany and Australia, for example, integration in the 
main system has started with hospital-based palliative care 
and follows the main payment system for hospital care 
accordingly. Similarly, in Poland, payment for palliative 
care in outpatient settings follows the payment mechanism 
for long-term care. In The Netherlands, the split between 
payment mechanisms for acute care and long-term care is 
followed for hospital- and community-based palliative 
care services, respectively.
The basis on which payments to providers of services 
are made can be categorised as non-activity-based and 
activity-based. In non-activity-based payment, the amount 
of resource received by the service provider does not 
increase when service provision increases. With activity-
based payment, providers receive more funds when the 
level of service provision increases.
In most countries, a mix of activity-based and non-
activity-based payment exists, although the split between 
them can be on different levels. In Spain, for example, 
hospital-based services receive activity-based funding (per 
diem), whereas community-based services receive non-
activity-based funding (capitation). In Norway, 50% of 
revenue for hospital-based services is non-activity-based 
(block contract) and 50% is activity-based (per care epi-
sode). In Germany’s community-based services on the 
other hand, provider and insurer preferences determine 
whether payment is activity- or non-activity-based (e.g. 
per diem or block contract, with variation in length). 
Similarly, in the hospital setting, payment is activity-
based, either per diem (20%) or episode based (80%) in 
line with preferences and negotiations.
Table 4 provides an overview of non-activity-based pay-
ment mechanisms. Non-activity-based funding does not 
increase along with provision, therefore largely shifting the 
financial risk of service provision to the provider, espe-
cially in situations of ageing population, longer chronic dis-
ease trajectories and greater co-morbidity, leading to 
increasing demand. In England, Germany, Ireland, New 
Zealand and Norway, block contracts are often used to pay 
for services. These are frequently based on historical allo-
cation and lack a clear rationale, although sometimes 
adjustments are made for population and service character-
istics. A more sophisticated site-specific budget exists in 
Australia, which is based on actual expenses and character-
istics of service provision. Spain, Sweden and Wales 
employ capitation-based resource allocation, in which the 
level of funding depends on the size of the population cov-
ered, irrespective of actual service provision to that popula-
tion. Failing to adjust for more resource-intense rural 
services can negatively affect care, as reported in Spain.
Table 3. Basis for payment.
Country Integration in main payment mechanism Non-activity-based payment Activity-based payment
Australia + (only for hospital-based inpatient 
services)
+ +
England − + + (local initiatives only, 
national testing underway)
Germany + (only for hospital-based inpatient 
services support teams)
+ +
Hungary + + +
Ireland − + −
New Zealand − + − (testing unsatisfactory)
The Netherlands + + +
Norway + + +
Poland + (in long-term care payment 
mechanism)
− +
Spain + + +
Sweden + + +
Switzerland − − +
USA + + +
Wales + + −
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Activity-based funding increases with more service 
provision, which reduces the financial risk to the service 
provider in the context of increasing demand but increases 
the risk when demand diminishes. Table 5 provides an 
overview of the different activity-based payment mecha-
nisms in place.
The most common example of activity-based funding 
in palliative care is a payment per bed day. Sometimes 
adjustment of the standard daily rate takes place, for exam-
ple, for rural provision in Hungary, and for each referral 
mechanism in Sweden.
The level at which these payments and adjustments are 
set determines the effect it will have on financial viability 
and service provision. When payments are set below the 
average costs of service provision for their patient group, 
services do not break even. Services run a financial risk 
taking on patients – especially more complex patients – 
that require resource-intense treatment. Per diem or pay-
ments without adjustment for complexity or needing 
frequent or prolonged visits may cause problems. Service 
providers with a heavier caseload may be pushed to ‘cherry 
pick’ those who are less complex and easier to treat, 
although there is no evidence this happens, making it dif-
ficult for the severely ill to access services.
Another type of activity-based funding reimburses dif-
ferent rates based on a variable that predicts the level of 
resource use within a defined time period (per care episode 
or spell). This reduces the financial risk of overpayment to 
the funder, while reducing the risk of underpayment to the 
service provider, as the amount reimbursed more closely 
matches the expenditure. Outside palliative care, diagnosis 
may be a good predictor of resource use and therefore a 
Table 4. Non-activity-based payment mechanisms.
Country Basis for payment
Australia Site-specific budget
England Block contacts (historical)
Spot purchasing
Germany Block contacts
Hungary Reallocation from general hospital budget/
other departments
Ireland Block contracts (historical; based on 
population served, services provided)
New Zealand Block contracts (historical)
Hospital-based: reallocation from general 
hospital budget
The Netherlands Capitation (network care) and overall 
budgets for service regulation
Norway Block contracts (based on population 
characteristics and area served)
Spain Capitation (population in area, no urban/
rural weighting)
Sweden Site-specific budget or capitation
USA Reallocation from general hospital budget
Wales Capitation
Table 5. Activity-based payment mechanisms.
Country Unit of care Variables used
Australia Care episode Patient-level: phase of illness, age, performance score
Handling outliers: per diem outlier payments for very short/long stay 
patients, as well as service use and patient-level variables like intensive 
care unit use, indigeneity and radiotherapy use
England Care episodea Service-level: care settinga
Patient-level: phase of illness, functional status, problem severity
Germany Per diem
Care episode
None
Length of stay: 6 or less, 7–13, 14–20, 21 or more days of treatment17
Hungary Per diem +10%–20% in rural areas
Handling outliers: capped to 150 days of care
The Netherlands Per diem (hospice-based)
Care episode (hospital-based)
Service-level: overnight stays, diagnostic assessment and treatment 
(outpatient care and number of contacts)
Norway Care episode Service-level: service characteristics
Poland Per diem/per visit +20% and 70% (enteral and parenteral nutrition)
Spain Per diem None
Sweden Per diem Service-level: referral mechanism
Switzerland Per diem
Care episodea
None
Patient-level: stability, symptoms, family burden/support issuesa
Process-level: decision-making processes, organisational 
characteristics
USA Per diem
Per encounter or procedure 
(billing)
None
Complexity and setting
aCurrently undergoing testing.
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suitable basis for payment in the form of diagnosis-related 
groups (DRGs). Within palliative care, however, diagnosis 
does not accurately predict the level of care input required 
and thus resource use.17
In The Netherlands, Germany and Norway, episode of 
care-based payment of hospital-based advisory services is 
therefore based on service characteristics and/or provision 
(length of treatment/hours of care provided). Patient char-
acteristic-based payment has been explored in New 
Zealand and Australia. In New Zealand, the system was 
rejected out of fear of ‘cherry picking’ and overprovision 
of certain services (including bereavement care).
In Australia, on the other hand, a patient characteristic-
based payment model has been successfully introduced in 
New South Wales and is being rolled out nationally. The 
amount of reimbursement received per patient varies by 
performance status, phase of illness, care setting and age. 
If variables are chosen correctly, these payment mecha-
nisms draw appropriate levels of resource to address dif-
ferent levels of patient need.18 Similar patient-characteristic 
payment models are now proposed and explored in 
England and Switzerland.
Further specification of a payment model can be a top-
up – with a non-palliative care DRG running alongside or 
replacement tariff. Supplementary regulations are required 
to care for ‘Outliers’, patients with very low or high 
resource intensity, and fairly share the financial risk. In 
Australia, this is handled with per diem payments for 
patients with very short or long stays, as well as service 
use and patient-level variables like intensive care unit use, 
indigenous background and radiotherapy use.
Along with increased availability of public funds, in 
recent years, public authorities have posed criteria and qual-
ity standards on palliative care service providers not only to 
be eligible for public funding but also to oncology depart-
ments to provide palliative care services. The availability of 
a specialised clinician is a common structural requirement, 
and comprehensive (multidisciplinary) assessment a com-
mon procedural requirement, both intended to push service 
development. In The Netherlands, it is obliged to have mul-
tiple medical specialties in the multidisciplinary team and 
more teams build relationships with community care. We 
have not come across outcome indicators as requirements 
for funding. In Sweden, some services have lost government 
support after failing to meet audit criteria.
Discussion
We have applied a model for funding and reimbursement 
of health care services on palliative care funding models 
and described the diverse models and funding flows in a 
consistent and systematic way for the first time. This 
shows a wide variation in funding mechanisms for hospital 
and community-based palliative care services, reflecting 
both national differences in financial context and care 
provision, as well as some common themes. First, funding 
is rarely linked to population need and often perpetuates 
existing – inequitable – patterns in service provision. 
Second, palliative care funding is frequently characterised 
as a mixed system of charitable, public and private payers. 
Theoretically, multiple sources of funding lead to increased 
funding; in practice, however, it can cause responsibilities 
to be unclear, administrative complexities, and unclear 
sustainability. Third, the basis on which providers are paid 
for services is rarely based on care input and individual 
patient-level needs. This is recognised in the gradual move 
from non-activity-based funding (e.g. block contracts) to 
activity-based reimbursement (e.g. per diems, procedure-
based DRGs). Activity-based payment can be further 
refined in casemix based models through which the level 
of payment is adjusted for individual patient-level need, 
which requires further research into accurate predictors of 
care use.
The variability in funding mechanisms has two major 
implications for health economics research on palliative 
care across countries. First is that the ability to conduct 
large-scale health economics research on palliative care is 
dependent on having a clear signal of palliative care provi-
sion in the administrative data generated, and the strength 
of the data signal is driven by the funding model. In the 
United States, for example, there is a very clear data signal 
for Hospice, because it is a distinct insurance benefit, but 
no or weak signal for specialist palliative care outside of 
Hospice, because the patients, activities and providers are 
not distinctly called out as specialist palliative care. The 
nature of the data signal will also vary by specific funding 
mechanism. Countries that base palliative care funding on 
patient needs and complexity may generate data on patients 
with different levels of complexity or need, which could be 
useful in economics-focused research. Countries that use 
activity-based funding may generate data on the frequency, 
intensity and duration of palliative care services that could 
also be very useful in such research. Researchers seeking 
to conduct international or multi-national research on the 
use, timing and impact of palliative care must first under-
stand what data will be available regarding palliative care 
patients and palliative care services.
The second implication of this study is in regard to the 
interpretation of economics research from one country to 
another. Knowing what entity (patient, hospital, service 
area, private insurer or public insurer) is at financial risk 
for over-utilisation of costly services at the end of life (e.g. 
hospital admissions) is crucial for understanding how the 
research on economics of palliative care (e.g. cost reduc-
tion; avoidance of hospitalisations) would incentivise the 
investment and provision of palliative care in hospitals and 
community settings. This analysis has been done for the 
USA,19 but to our knowledge has not yet applied to other 
countries. Similarly one country may shift costs from pri-
vate insurance or government payers to the patients and 
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families more or less than another; it is therefore critical to 
know the extent to which that is happening and whether 
researchers are measuring patients’ out-of-pocket costs in 
the countries where palliative care financial impact is 
being studied.
This work has provided some clarity as to how and 
where funding mechanisms might act as policy levers. 
Table 6 summarises how funding arrangements can be 
applied to support the development of acceptable and 
effective palliative care through listing desirable features 
of a palliative care funding model. Funding models must 
be used to reward excellence, while minimising ‘per-
verse’ incentives. Through engagement in reshaping 
funding and reimbursement mechanisms, patient care can 
be improved, high-quality care rewarded and equity 
ensured. To improve a local palliative care funding 
model, it is important to understand the context in which 
it operates. The international financial crisis has posed 
economic pressure on health systems internationally, 
with governments taking steps to increase out-of-pocket 
payments, decrease care coverage and cut expendi-
tures.20,21 The solutions to some of the cost crises in 
health care lie with systematic understanding of costs and 
funding flows and better awareness of the relationship 
between outcomes and costs.6 At the same time, invest-
ments in palliative and end-of-life care are being sug-
gested as areas of opportunity to increase health systems’ 
value for money.22 This opens a window of opportunity to 
attract funding and shape funding systems to produce 
better care outcomes. However, detailed understanding 
of the costs and outcomes of different palliative care 
models, the relation with non-palliative care interven-
tions and their interactions is required to foresee the 
effects of new structural and financial arrangements. 
Here, clinical teams and palliative care providers share 
the responsibility in leading improvements and reducing 
variation in care by defining good practice and measuring 
their activity, costs and outcomes.22,23 Through active 
involvement in funding reform, we can stimulate the 
development of palliative care.
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